We develop a dynamic model of monopolistic competition which sheds light on how the interplay between the degree of product dierentiation and intertemporal elasticity of substitution aects the steady-state equilibrium. Consumers love variety and split their labor endowment between wage labor, which brings immediate income, and producing capital, which yields a rent in the future. The impact of the elasticity of substitution across varieties on the market outcome depends crucially on whether consumption today and consumption tomorrow are gross substitutes or gross complements. The case of Cobb-Douglas intertemporal utility is a borderline situation, when the market outcome is invariant to the degree of product dierentiation. We also fully characterize the unique steady-state equilibrium path and show that the key dynamic properties of the model, such as local stability and determinacy of equilibrium, also hinge mainly on the interplay between the intra-and intertemporal elasticities of substitution.
Introduction
Ever since Joan Robinson (1956 Robinson ( , 2013 , it has been widely acknowledged among economists that the economic nature of capital is somewhat obscure. To put it bluntly, the sole feature of capital most economists agree on is that capital accumulation is essentially a dynamic process. As a consequence, taking into account the intertemporal nature of agents' decisions is critical for understanding the implications of these decisions.
Two questions naturally arise in this respect. First, how can the intertemporal nature of capital accumulation aect the market structure, i.e. the behavior of product variety and toughness of competition on imperfectly competitive markets? Second, is there a feedback eect of the market structure today on capital accumulation decisions tomorrow? To the best of our knowledge, recent theoretical models that involve imperfect competition, product dierentiation and capital markets focus mostly on issues of international trade and economic geography (Martin and Rogers, 1995; Bernard et al., 2007; Kichko et al., 2014) .
These authors treat capital as a factor of production in its own right, whose endowment is exogeneously given, just like that of labor. This is in the line with Hecksher-Ohlin tradition, where this strand of literature eventually belongs. Although those settings are well-suited to the purposes they pursue, they do not answer the two questions posed above. In this paper, we delve deeper into this issue, and examine the implications of the Ricardian worldview, in which labor is treated as the sole ultimate production factor, while capital can be dissolved into the units of labor (Sandmo, 2011, Ch. 4) .
To achieve our purpose, we propose a new dynamic model of imperfect competition, which extends Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) by endogenizing capital formation. The way we choose to model capital accumulation is as follows. In allocating their labor endowments, variety-loving individuals face a trade-o between wage labor , which brings immediate income, and production of capital , which promises a rent in the future.
This paper investigates
how the solution to this trade-o is driven by the demand-side characteristics of the economy, namely, by the interplay of consumers' love for variety with their intertemporal elasticity of substitution.
Unlike numerous dynamic settings involving imperfect competition, where a homogeneous nal good is typically produced by means of a dierentiated intermediate good (Grossman and Helpman, 1990; Romer, 1990; Benassy, 1987 Benassy, , 1993 Chou and Shy, 1991) , our model describes a one-sector economy with a dierentiated nal good 5 This dierence is not accidental: that consumers are variety-lovers is an essential part of the story.
Our main ndings can be summarized as follows. First and foremost, we provide clearcut comparative statics of the steady-state equilibrium with respect to the demand-side characteristics. Namely, we show that an increase in substitutability across varieties supplied at the same time period aects the equilibrium pattern in a more complex way than in the 4 Thus, we treat the concept of capital rather loosely, without focusing on the specicities of physical or nancial capital. Improving labor qualication, i.e. investing in human capital, may also be viewed as capital production.
5 A recent example of using a similar approach is Bilbiie et al. (2012) . static models of monopolistic competition. The key-factor is whether consumption today and consumption tomorrow are gross substitutes or gross complements. In the former case, a higher degree of product dierentiation (i.e. poorer intratemporal substitutability) leads to more rms and smaller rm sizes, as well as to a reduction in consumption expenditure of the young agents, hence to a hike in investment and capital stock. In the latter case, all these results are reversed. The case of Cobb-Douglas intertemporal utility is the borderline: the market outcome is neutral to the degree of product dierentiation. Thus, we nd it fair to say that care is needed in using the elasticity of substitution as a measure of toughness of competition, as is typically done in the literature.
Second, we nd that when the intertemporal utility is Cobb-Douglas, industry dynamics is plagued by severe structural instability. On the one hand, in this special case the steady state is globally stable. On the other hand, however, an arbitrarily small perturbation of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution triggers local instability (formally, the steady state becomes a saddle). The intuitive reasoning for this goes as follows. Higher fraction of consumers' time spent yesterday on producing capital invites more rms to enter. Because of love for variety, broader product range impels today's generation of consumers to allocate more time for wage labor. This eventually reduces product diversity tomorrow. Moreover, when intertemporal elasticity of substitution is in the vicinity of 1, this pendulum eect becomes so strong that the equilibrium path comes to be generically unstable, even though a one-dimensional locally stable manifold exists. This eect abruptly vanishes in the CobbDouglas case, where the shares of labor spent for working at rms and for producing capital are constant.
Third, we provide a full characterization of the unique symmetric equilibrium path.
Dynamic equilibrium is locally determinate (i.e. it is a saddle) when consumption today and consumption tomorrow are neither very good substitutes nor very strong complements.
When this condition fails to hold, the equilibrium is either fully unstable or indeterminate.
Furthermore, the corresponding threshold values of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution depend solely on the degree of product dierentiation, hence they are independent of the discount factor, as well as of the supply-side parameters. In other words, what really matters for the behavior of the market outcome is the relationship between the two elasticities of substitution: the intra-and the intertemporal.
Related literature. The prominent role of intertemporal substitutability / complementarity has been stressed in dierent contexts. For example, Azariadis (1983) has shown that, for non-trivial equilibria involving self-fullling prophecies to exist, leisure today and consumption tomorrow must be gross complements. Similarly, Cazzavillan et al. (1998) view capital-labor substitutability and labor supply elasticity as the key factors of endogenous uctuations. In our model, this dichotomy is crucial for the behavior of the economy.
Otherwise, however, we dier from the above literature because we restrict ourselves to perfect foresight dynamics. This is done because the role of agents' beliefs, being one of the keystones of the modern research agenda in macroeconomics, is outside the scope of this paper, which rather belongs to the domain of industrial organization. Lloyd-Braga (2005, 2008) stress the role of variable markups and free entry in oligopolistic settings with endogenous uctuations. Unlike them, we nd that dynamic monopolistic competition may feature structural instability even under constant markups.
In this respect, we are closer to Seegmuller (2008) , who investigates how taste for variety triggers local indeterminacy in a dynamic model of monopolistic competition. Our main novelty compared to these authors is that we provide a simple and complete characterization of steady-state equilibrium behavior in terms of comparisons between the degree of love for variety and intertemporal elasticity of substitution.
Viewing monopolistically competitive equilibrium as a steady state of a dynamic process is a common feature of our model with Melitz (2003) , Asplund and Nocke (2006) and Bernard et al. (2007) . However, these authors focus on intertemporal decisions of rms rather than consumers. Because in our model intertemporal decisions are taken on the consumers' side, it is better suited to studying the impact of demand-side characteristics on the market outcome.
We also dier from Galor and Zeira (1993), for our model involves neither credit market imperfections, nor intergenerational altruism. On top of this, we do not assume any heterogeneity across consumers, apart from coexistence of two generations of consumers each period. Thus, it seems fair to say that nding structural instability in a setting as simple as ours singles out a new facet of the profound idea that market mechanisms are inherently dynamically unstable (Boldrin and Woodford, 1990 ).
Finally, Gil Molto and Varvarigos (2012) study the impact of occupational choice and enterpreneurship on industry dynamics in a setting similar to ours. The key ingredient of their approach is that consumers choose whether to become a worker or to launch a rm.
6
A distinctive feature of our model is that there is no leisure: the main trade-o households face is between alternative allocations of labor. This allows us to obtain a characterization of the market outcome in terms of solely demand side characteristics under perfectly inelastic labor supply.
The model and preliminary results
We use a discrete-time dynamic framework, which traces the overlapping generations model (Diamond, 1965) . At each time t = 0, 1, 2... a continuum of varieties is supplied. This model allows studying the interaction between endogenous capital formation and the degree of product dierentiation, which is driven by market interactions between consumers and rms.
6 See also Behrens et al. (2014) , for a static model of enterpreneurial self-selection based on related ideas.
Consumers
At each time t = 0, 1, 2... the economy is endowed with L consumers. The population L is assumed to be independent of t. Each consumer lives for two periods. As a result, during the period (t, t + 1] the total population involves L/2 old consumers and L/2 young consumers.
Young individuals, the only source of whose immediate income is wage labor, split their time between working at a rm and producing capital.
7 In other words, for each t-consumer i.e. a consumer who is young at time t the time constraint holds:
where t , κ t ≥ 0 are, respectively, the shares of time spent working at a rm and producing capital. We show later on that this way of modeling capital production at the individual level essentially leads to the classical capital accumulation equation at the aggregate level.
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During her lifetime, each t-consumer also faces two budget constraints:
Here n t is the mass of varieties supplied at time t, x i t (respectively, z j t+1 ) is the individual consumption level of variety i ∈ [0, n t ] (respectively, j ∈ [0, n t+1 ]) at time t (respectively, t + 1), p i t is the price of variety i supplied at time t, while r t+1 is the price of capital.
9
The children's budget constraint (2) says that the expenditure of a young agent cannot exceed her earnings, the wage rate being normalized to 1. The parents face the budget constraint (3), which highlights potential incentives of producing capital: it can be rented to rms in the future, being the only source of income for old consumers.
Preferences of a t-consumer are described by her lifetime utility, which is given by the following two-tier CES utility function:
, θ > 0, (4) where θ stands for the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor, while X t and Z t+1 are the CES consumption indices in the two neighbouring periods:
7 Saying that consumers make savings would not be correct, for there is no money in our model, i.e. no universal means to transfer part of labor income to the next period. For the same reason, inter-generational borrowing and lending do not take place.
8 See the discussion after equation (14) .
9 Several economic interpretations may be suggested for what we call producing capital. One possible interpretation is that young consumers spend part of their time on learning, thus increasing their future endowment of skilled labor, as opposed to the unskilled labor they supply to rms when they are young. In this context, r t+1 is the wage dierential between skilled and unskilled workers.
, σ > 1.
Two-tier CES intertemporal preferences described by (4) (5) were introduced in a dierent context by d' Aspremont and Ferreira (1985) , in a model of oligopolistic competition that allowed for involuntary unemployment.
In equations (5), σ is the instantaneous elasticity of substitution across varieties consumed within the same time period. When θ → 1, we obtain the Cobb-Douglas-over-CES utility
as a limiting case.
Combining (1) (4) Solving this program yields the following Marshallian demands:
where P t and P t+1 stand, respectively, for the CES price indices at times t and t + 1:
.
Recall that t is the share of a t-consumer's labor endowment spent for wage labor, while κ t = 1 − t is time spent for producing capital. As shown in Appendix 1, we have
Several comments are in order. First, equation (10) shows that the only endogenous variable relevant for consumers' decisions about allocating their labor endowment is the real interest rate (1 + r t+1 )P t /P t+1 , which is the ination-adjusted price of capital. Second, when current consumption and future consumption are substitutes (θ > 1), the amount of labor spent for producing capital increases with the price r t+1 of capital, which is fairly intuitive. However, this result is reversed when current consumption and future consumption are complements (θ < 1). Finally, it is implied by (10) that κ t (respectively, t ) always increases with the discount factor β for a given real interest rate. This is also fairly natural:
the more consumers care for the future, the higher the amount of capital they produce.
When θ → 1, (10) boils down to t = 1/(1 + β) and κ t = β/(1 + β). In other words, the consumer's choice between working at a rm and producing capital no longer varies with the real interest rate (1 + r t+1 )P t /P t+1 . It is only the discount factor β that remains relevant. Aggregate demands. The aggregate demand faced by a t-rm i is obtained as the sum of individual demands of all consumers for variety i. As the total population at time t is composed by a mass L/2 of young t-consumers and a mass L/2 of old (t − 1)-consumers,
where Ω t is the demand shifter given by
Two remarks are needed before proceeding. First, the market demands (11) are isoelastic in price. Indeed, because each rm is negligible to the market, it cannot strategically manipulate the price index P t , nor the demand shifter Ω( t−1 , t ). Second, equation (11) also reveals the dynamic nature of competition in our model. Even though each rm operates during only one period, the demand schedule faced by a particular rm is aected not only by behavior of all the other rms of the same generation, but also of those belonging to the neighboring generations. Indeed, as implied by (10), the labor shares t−1 and t involve the price indices P t−1 , P t and P t+1 , and so does the demand shifter Ω t . 11 Combining this with (11) implies that prots of rm i are given by 10 It can be shown that this result still holds for a more general class of preferences given by U t = ln X(x t )+ β ln Z(z t+1 ), where X(·) and Z(·) are non-specied linear-homogeneous consumption indices.
11 This cost structure treats labor and capital as perfect complements. To allow for substitutability between production factors, we could use a Cobb-Douglas specication of costs instead, as in Bernard et al. (2007) . This, however, makes the analysis more involved, while the key results remain qualitatively the same. Because we are interested mainly in studying the impact of demand side on the market outcome, we choose to work with the simplest possible cost structure.
Equation (12) highlights the inter-generational competitive linkages between rms.
Using (12) , it is readily veried that the rst order condition for prot maximization is given
As immediately implied by (13) , prot-maximizing prices are constant over time. This simplistic feature of the model is well-known to be a by-product of using CES preferences under monopolistic competition. Although working with more general preferences could obviate this pitfall, this would make the analysis substantially more involved, and lead us too much astray of the key insights of the paper. We therefore choose to work here with a tractable CES model, which allows obtaining clear-cut results. We will postpone the discussion of potential extensions in this dimension until the concluding section.
Timing. A natural way to specify timing of the game in our framework would be to assume a sequential game, the reason being that t-rms move after τ -rms, where t > τ . To be more precise, a t-rm (i) observes the whole history of prices and takes it as given, and (ii)
accurately anticipates prot-maximizing behavior of rms which are to be launched in the future. However, because we work within a monopolistically competitive framework where rms are non-atomic, each rm is well aware of being unable to alter the prot-maximizing prices of future rms by changing its individual behavior. As a consequence, things work as if the game among all rms were simultaneous.
Factor markets
Factor markets are assumed to be perfectly competitive. Capital produced by t-consumers is used to launch rms at time t + 1. Starting a rm requires f units of capital, while the number of young consumers at time t equals L t (1 + g)/(2 + g). Hence, the capital market balance condition is given by
Equation (14) shows that our description of capital evolution is formally equivalent to the standard equation K t+1 = I t , where K stands for capital stock, I is aggregate investment, and the depreciation rate is 100%. Indeed, the left-hand side of (14) is the total amount of labor spent for producing capital at time t, which can be treated as aggregate investment, while the right-hand side of (14) is the total capital requirement in the economy at time t + 1.
Combining this with the time constraint (1) and the young consumer's budget constraint (2), which both hold with equality because preferences are non-satiated, we obtain
Labor supplied by t-consumers is used by rms operating at time t. Hence, the labor market balance condition is given by
where q i t is the level of output produced by t-rm i.
Finally, the product market clearing conditions state that the volume of aggregate demand for each variety i ∈ [0, n t ] at each time t equals the supply volume:
Using (2) and (17), the labor balance (16) may be restated as follows:
Symmetric free-entry equilibrium path
In this section, we provide the key result that highlights how the two elasticities of substitution, σ and θ, jointly aect the market outcome. It will be shown that the impact of σ on rms' sizes and the mass of rms at a symmetric equilibrium path hinges crucially on whether present and future consumption are substitutes (θ > 1) or complements (θ < 1).
In the borderline case of Cobb-Douglas upper-tier utiltiy (θ = 1), σ aects neither rm sizes, nor the number of rms. This result shows that the interpretation of σ as a measure of toughness of competition needs care, for it disregards the nature of consumers' intertemporal preferences.
Symmetric equilibrium conditions
We begin with a denition of an equilibrium path. Denition 1. An equilibrium path is a sequence (p t , x t , z t , q t , n t , r t , κ t , t ) ∞ t=0 , which satises (1) (3), (8) (9), and (13) (18).
In order to dene a symmetric free-entry equilibrium path, we denote by I S the indicator function of S ⊆ R. Denition 2. A symmetric free-entry equilibrium (SFE) path is an equilibrium path such that (i) the price schedule, the demand schedules and the output schedule are symmetric at each time t, i.e.
for some p t , x t , z t , q t ≥ 0, and (ii) the zero-prot condition holds:
At a symmetric outcome, factor-market balances (15) and (18) 
and
Equation (21) says that the prot-maximizing markup at time t must be equal to the share of parents' consumption in the total consumption. In other words, a higher share of GDP consumed by the older generation means higher monopoly power of rms.
Furthermore, the product market clearing conditions (17) becomes
Dividing (8) over (9) and taking into account that P t = p t n 1/(1−σ) t for all t, we obtain the following rst-order condition for a t-consumer's utility maximization program along a symmetric equilibrium path:
Using symmetry, the rst-order condition (13) for a t-rm boils down to
To sum up, a SFE path satises (19) (24).
SFE path: existence, uniqueness, and comparative statics
Combining (24) with (19), we obtain the following relationship between the t-rm's size q t and the price of capital 1 + r t :
The intuition behind (25) is easy to grasp: when capital is more costly, rms have to produce more to cover the xed costs.
Combining (24) with (22) yields
Multiplying both parts of (23) by (L/2) −1/θ and using (25) (26), we obtain a system of two dierence equations over the (q t , n t )-plane:
The coecient Θ in equation (27) is time-invariant and is dened by
Equations (28) (27) specify an autonomous dynamic system over the (q t , n t )-plane. This system has a unique steady state (q * , n * ), which is given by
Plugging q * into (25) implies that the equilibrium price of capital r * is such that
Finally, as implied by (14) , the shares * and κ * of the individual labor endowment allocated for, respectively, wage labor and production of capital, are given, respectively, by
Using (29), (30) , and (31), we come to the following result.
Proposition 1.
(i) A unique symmetric equilibrium path (q * , n * , r * ) exists.
(ii) The equilibrium rm size q * increases in σ if and only if θ > 1, increases in θ if and only if σ > 2, and always decreases in β. Several comments are in order. First, as shown by claims (ii) and (iii) of Proposition 1, the impact of a higher σ on the market outcome is very dierent in the cases of substitutability and complementarity between present consumption and future consumption. The reason for this is that rms operating at time t compete, in a sense, with rms operating at time t + 1, even though these two populations of rms operate at dierent time periods, hence they never meet at the same market. Nonetheless, total consumers' budget splits between two periods, which makes it legitimate to view rms belonging to two subsequent generations as indirect competitors, toughness of competition between them being measured by means of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution θ. This dimension of competition cannot be captured by the standard CES model of monopolistic competition, in which we extensive survey and discussion), where a higher σ unambiguously implies bigger rms and less rms in equilibria. The reason why we obtain a very dierent result is that we take into account the intertemporal dimension of consumers' decisions.
Third, an increase in θ makes competition tougher or softer depending on whether σ exceeds or not the threshold value σ = 2. This result, just like the previous one, highlights the signicant role of the interaction between the two elasticities of substitution in molding the properties of the market outcome.
In addition, claim (iv) of Proposition 1 describes the impact of the degree of product dierentiation on labor allocation. When intertemporal substitutability prevails (i.e. θ > 1), the individuals are willing to work less for the rms and more on their own when varieties get more dierentiated (i.e. when a drop of σ occurs). In other words, individuals agree to consume less today, being rewarded by higher future consumption. If, on the contrary, preferences show intertemporal complementarity, then the share of labor endowment allocated for wage labor decreases.
Stability analysis
In this subsection, we show how endogenous uctuations emerge in the vicinity of the steady state (q * , n * ).
Case 1: θ = 1. This case can be viewed as a borderline between the situations of intertemporal substitutability and intertemporal complementarity, for present and future consumption are neither substitutes nor complements. This is because, when θ = 1, we arrive back to the Cobb-Douglas upper-tier utility described by (6) .
Equation (27) boils down to
Θn t+1 = q t n t .
(32)
Combining (32) with (28) pins down the equilibrium values of q t and n t :
As implied by (33), whatever the initial state (q 0 , n 0 ) is, the system immediately jumps into the steady state (29) and stays there forever. In other words, when θ = 1, arbitrary initial conditions do not result in indeterminacy. The following Proposition is a summary.
Proposition 2. When θ = 1, the SFE path (q * , n * , r * ) given by (29) (30) is globally stable.
Intuitively, Proposition 2 says that under θ = 1 the dynamics is fully determinate: no equilibrium paths dierent from (q * , n * ) exist in the vicinity of (q * , n * ).
Case 2: θ = 1. We now come to the case when present and future consumption are either substitutes or complements. In this case, we can uniquely solve (27) (28) in terms of q t+1 and n t+1 . This yieds the following discrete-time deterministic dynamic system over the plane (q t , n t ):
We start with a full description of (q * , n * ) in terms of local stability.
Proposition 3.
(i) The steady state (q * , n * ) is a sink if and only if the following system of inequalities holds:
(ii) The steady state (q * , n * ) is a saddle if and only if the following inequality holds:
(iii) Otherwise, (q * , n * ) is a source.
Proof. The proof relies on the geometric technique of local stability analysis proposed by Grandmont et al. (1998) , which we apply to the dynamic system given by (34) (35).
See Appendix 2 for details.
Proposition 3 provides a complete characterization of dynamics described by the system (34) (35) in the vicinity of (q * , n * ). However, revealing the economic implications of (36) (37) requires further analysis. Scrutinizing condition (37) shows that (q * , n * ) is a saddle when θ is in the vicinity of 1. To be precise, the following proposition holds.
Proposition 4. Assume that θ = 1. Then, given the static elasticity of substitution σ, there exist threshold values θ(σ) and θ(σ) of θ, satisfying
and such that the steady state (q * , n * ) is a saddle when θ(σ) < θ < θ(σ).
Proof. The sketch of the proof is as follows. When θ → 1, (37) boils down to β > −1, which is always true. Hence, by continuity, (q * , n * ) is a saddle if θ is in the vicinity of 1.
This completes the proof. The closed-form solutions for θ(σ) and θ(σ), as well as the details of the proof, are given in Appendix 3.
Two comments are in order. First, the economic intuition behind Proposition 3 can be formulated as follows: if present and future consumption are neither very close substitutes nor very strong complements, then the steady state (q * , n * ) is locally determinate. To put it bluntly, when θ is close enough to (but dierent from) 1, a unique equilibrium path exists in the vicinity of (q * , n * ), which converges to (q * , n * ) as t → ∞ (see Grandmont et al., 1998, for precise denitions). On the contrary, if present and future consumption are either close substitutes or strong complements, i.e. if θ diers considerably from 1, then (q * , n * ) may be locally indeterminate. We will see below when this holds true.
Second, it is worth noting that θ(σ) and θ(σ) are independent of the discount factor β. In other words, what is crucial for the result of Proposition 4 is solely the interplay between the degree of product dierentiation and intertemporal substitutability/complementarity, i.e. between σ and θ, while the degree of consumers' patience measured by β plays no signicant role.
Structural instability. Comparing Propositions 2 and 4 leads to a curious insight on the nature of preferences described by a CES lower-tier utility nested into a Cobb-Douglas upper-tier utility. Such preferences are given by (6) . Both when θ = 1 and when θ is close to (but dierent from) 1, there is no indeterminacy. However, the reasons for this are very dierent in each of the two cases. In the former case, indeterminacy does not occur because, regardless of how far away from (q * , n * ) the pre-determined initial state (q 0 , n 0 ) ∈ R 2 + is, the system jumps into the steady state (q * , n * ) at t = 1, and remains there further. What rules out indeterminacy in the latter case is the existence of a one-dimensional locally stable manifold in the vicinity of (q * , n * ). Therefore, Cobb-Douglas over CES preferences may be viewed as structurally unstable, in the sense that an arbitrarily small variation of θ changes the type of dynamics (see Grandmont, 2008 , for details).
What happens when θ is distant from 1? In this case, (q * , n * ) may become unstable.
To be more precise, the following result holds.
Proposition 5. There exist threshold values θ (σ) and θ(σ) of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution θ, satisfying
and such that (q * , n * ) is a source when either θ < θ (σ), or θ > θ(σ).
Proof. See Appendix 4.
In other words, Proposition 5 states that, when present and future consumpions are either very close substitutes or very strong complements, the system tends to be unstable.
Indeterminacy zone. (ii) If at least one of the assumptions (a) and (b) does not hold, the equilibrium is either a saddle or a source.
Proof. See Appendix 5. Figure 1 illustrates the results of the above stability analysis for (q * , n * ). which may be summarized as follows. First, the key-factor of both (non-)stability and (in)determinacy of the equilibtium path (q * , n * ) is the interplay between σ and θ, whereas the role of the discount factor β is rather limited. Second, the equilibrium tends to be locally stable and determinate when consumption today and consumption tomorrow are neither very good substitutes nor very strong complements; otherwise, the equilibrium path tends to be unstable. The white zones of Figure 1 contain the bifurcation loci, the exact shape of which depends on the value of the discount factor β. Finally, indeterminacy takes place solely in a bounded region (the red zone on Figure 1 ) of the unbounded (σ, θ)-plane. This region satises two simultaneous properties: (i) the values of σ and θ are relatively close to each other, and (ii) both σ and θ are neither too high nor too low. In other words, indeterminacy occurs only when vareties are moderate substitutes. Qualifying the case of 2 < σ < 3.4489 as moderate substitutability can be justied by appealing to the calibrated value of σ = 3. to the case where rms operate for more than one period might also be interesting. This extension may lead to producers' behavior similar to that of multi-product rms, the reason being that rms' future demand can cannibalize their current demand.
Appendix 1: Derivation of equations (10) .
The consumer's upper-tier problem is given by:
s.t.
The rst order condition of (38) (39) is as follows:
Combining this with (39) yields the following expressions for the expenditure shares:
Using t = P t X t and (1 + r t+1 )κ t = P t+1 Z t+1 , we obtain (10).
Appendix 2: Proof of Proposition 3.
Evaluating the the Jacobi matrix J(q t , n t ) ≡ 
Using (40) (43), we obtain the following expressions for the trace trJ(q * , n * ) and the determinant detJ(q * , n * ) of the Jacobi matrix:
trJ(q * , n * ) = 1 1 − θ + 1 β (σ − 1)
detJ(q * , n * ) = 1 β (σ − 1) −1/θ (1 − σ + θ). 
Assume rst that that θ < 1, and that (47) holds. Then, the second inequality of (47) implies β(σ − 1) 1/θ − θ 2 + (2σ − 1)θ + 1 − σ < (1 − θ) β(σ − 1) 1/θ + θ + 1 − σ , which can be equivalently written as follows:
This is at odds with our assumptions about the parameters: θ > 0, β > 0, and σ > 1. Thus, assuming that (47) holds when θ < 1 leads to a contradiction. Hence, when present and future consumption are complements, the steady state is never a sink. 
The third inequality of (48) can be shown to be equivalent to 1 + (θ − 1)(σ − 1) 1/θ β+ β < −2θ 2 + (3σ − 1)θ − 2(σ − 1) (θ − 2)(σ − 1) 1/θ .
When does (52) hold for all β ∈ (0, 1)? This is true if and only if the right-hand side of (52) exceeds 1, or, equivalently, when the following inequality holds:
For any θ > 2, the expression in left-hand side of (53) describes a bell-shaped function of σ−1, which is positive when σ = 1 and goes to −∞ as σ → ∞. Hence, by the intermediate value theorem, there exists a single-valued function σ(θ) > 1, such that (53) holds if and only if σ > σ(θ). Moreover, it can be shown that σ(θ) is a strictly increasing function, and that σ(2) = 2, i.e. it maps bijectively [2, ∞) onto itself. Hence, σ(θ) has an inverse over [2, ∞), which we denote by θ 2 (σ). As a consequence, (53) holds if and only if θ < θ 2 (σ).
Finally, as σ(2) = 2, we also have θ 2 (2) = 2. When is (q * , n * ) a source for all β ∈ (0, 1)? This holds if and only either
